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Abstract
Background: World leaders remain committed to globally-coordinated oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) cessation
following successful eradication of wild polioviruses, but the best timing and strategy for implementation depend
on existing and emerging conditions.
Methods: Using an existing integrated global poliovirus risk management model, we explore alternatives to
the current timing plan of coordinated cessation of each OPV serotype (i.e., OPV1, OPV2, and OPV3 cessation
for serotypes 1, 2, and 3, respectively). We assume the current timing plan involves OPV2 cessation in 2016
followed by OPV1 and OPV3 cessation in 2019 and we compare this to alternative timing options, including
cessation of all three serotypes in 2018 or 2019, and cessation of both OPV2 and OPV3 in 2017 followed by
OPV1 in 2019.
Results: If Supplemtal Immunization Activity frequency remains sufficiently high through cessation of the last OPV
serotype, then all OPV cessation timing options prevent circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) outbreaks after
OPV cessation of any serotype. The various OPV cessation timing options result in relatively modest differences in
expected vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis cases and expected total of approximately 10–13 billion polio
vaccine doses used. However, the expected amounts of vaccine of different OPV formulations needed changes
dramatically with each OPV cessation timing option. Overall health economic impacts remain limited for timing
options that only change the OPV formulation but preserve the currently planned year for cessation of the
last OPV serotype and the global introduction of inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) introduction. Earlier
cessation of the last OPV serotype or later global IPV introduction yield approximately $1 billion in incremental net
benefits due to saved vaccination costs, although the logistics of implementation of OPV cessation remain uncertain
and challenging.
Conclusions: All countries should maintain the highest possible levels of population immunity to transmission for
each poliovirus serotype prior to the coordinated cessation of the OPV serotype to manage cVDPV risks. If OPV2
cessation gets delayed, then global health leaders should consider other OPV cessation timing options.
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Background
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) con-
tinues to make progress toward the primary goal of
interrupting all global transmission of the three wild
poliovirus (WPV) serotypes [1]. After apparent interrup-
tion of indigenous serotype 2 WPV (WPV2) by 2000 [2]
and no serotype 3WPV (WPV3) detections since late
2012 [3], the GPEI primarily focuses on interrupting sero-
type 1 WPV (WPV1) transmission. Only 3 countries re-
ported poliomyelitis cases due to indigenous WPV1 s in
2014 (i.e., Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Pakistan) but polio-
free countries with insufficient population immunity re-
main at risk of outbreaks due to imported WPV1 as
long as circulation continues anywhere [1]. In almost
all countries, WPV elimination resulted from aggressive
use of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) in both routine
immunization (RI) and supplemental immunization
activities (SIAs), which provides humoral and intestinal im-
munity to recipients and their close contacts. However, the
live, attenuated OPV vaccine comes with a risk of vaccine-
associated paralytic poliomyelitis (VAPP) disease in a very
small fraction of vaccine recipients and close contacts [4].
Moreover, populations with very low immunity may
allow OPV viruses to continue to circulate and eventu-
ally evolve to become circulating vaccine-derived polio-
viruses (cVDPVs) with properties similar to WPVs.
Multiple cVDPV outbreaks (defined as transmission
that led to 1 or more cases of paralytic poliomyelitis)
occurred to date [5–8], including re-established
(cVDPV2) in Northern Nigeria since 2005 [9, 10]. In
addition, long-term infection and potential excretion from
immunodeficiency-associated VDPVs (iVDPVs), which
occur in a small number of poliovirus-infected patients
with B-cell-related primary immunodeficiency disease can
pose a risk of reintroduction of polioviruses [6, 7, 11–13].
Ending the use of OPV stops the creation of new cVDPVs,
iVDPVs, and VAPP cases, and OPV cessation represents
the only means to eliminate the risks and poliomyelitis
cases associated with OPV use [7, 14].
OPV comes in different formulations. Trivalent OPV
(tOPV) protects against all three serotypes and repre-
sents the current vaccine of choice for OPV RI and the
vaccine used for SIAs up until 2004. In 2005, the GPEI
began using serotype 1 monovalent OPV (mOPV1) and
later some serotype 3 (mOPV3) for some SIAs, because
of their higher seroconversion (i.e., take rates) for the
mOPV serotype than achieved by the same serotype com-
ponent of tOPV, particularly for the first dose [15, 16]. In
2010, the GPEI turned to using bivalent OPV (bOPV, se-
rotypes 1 and 3), which provides higher take rates for both
serotypes 1 and 3 than achieved by the serotype 1 and 3
components of tOPV [15, 16]. However, the reduced reli-
ance on tOPV for SIAs created immunity gaps for sero-
type 2, which allowed numerous cVDPV2 emergences in
different countries [8]. The GPEI currently responds to
cVDPV2 outbreaks with tOPV, which takes at a similar
rate for serotype 2 as mOPV2 [15, 16]. Given the strong
evidence of WPV2 eradication and the ongoing burden of
paralytic poliomyelitis caused by cVDPV2s, the GPEI
plans to first globally-coordinate stopping the use of sero-
type 2-containing OPV (i.e., OPV2 cessation), followed by
cessation of all OPV containing the two other serotypes
(i.e., OPV13 cessation) after global WPV eradication of all
three serotypes [17]. Synchronizing global OPV cessation
of any serotype remains critical because countries that still
use OPV pose a risk of reintroducing live poliovirus into
countries that already stopped using OPV [18, 19].
The inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) currently
represents the only vaccine alternative to OPV. While
the killed, injectable IPV provides very good individual
protection from paralytic poliomyelitis and boosts in-
testinal immunity in individuals with immunity from a
prior live poliovirus infection (LPV, i.e., WPV, VDPV,
OPV, or OPV-related virus), it does not protect as well
against asymptomatic participation in poliovirus transmis-
sion as OPV, particularly in settings with more intense
fecal-oral transmission, and it does not spread beyond the
vaccine recipient [20–28]. Consequently, in populations
with predominantly fecal-oral poliovirus transmission,
serotype-specific population immunity to transmission
will drop significantly after OPV cessation of that serotype,
regardless of IPV use [29, 30]. The drop in population im-
munity after OPV cessation implies the need to achieve
the highest possible population immunity to transmission
at the time of OPV cessation to avoid cVDPV outbreaks
after OPV cessation [29, 30]. In places with intense fecal-
oral transmission and/or poor RI coverage, prior to stop-
ping vaccination with OPV for one or more serotypes,
countries should achieve high enough population immun-
ity to transmission by conducting pre-cessation SIAs using
OPV containing the serotype(s) to be stopped [29].
Recognizing the risks associated with OPV2 cessation,
the GPEI established 6 prerequisites for OPV2 cessation,
including the need to validate the elimination of persist-
ent cVDPV2s [17], which requires high population im-
munity to transmission for serotype 2 [31]. The reality
of recent or ongoing cVDPV2 transmission in countries
already facing significant challenges with completing and
verifying WPV eradication (i.e., Nigeria and Pakistan)
[31, 32] as well as long lead times associated with en-
suring sufficient tOPV supply for use in SIAs before
OPV2 cessation, raise questions about the feasibility of
OPV2 cessation by the target date of April 1, 2016 [33].
However, at this point in time, delaying planned OPV2
cessation would come with some reputation and pro-
grammatic risks. Moreover, the apparent but uncertain
global eradication of WPV3 [3] and increasing confi-
dence about its true disappearance as time increases
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since the last observed case [31], open up the possibility
of OPV3 cessation at the same time as OPV2 cessa-
tion (i.e., OPV23 cessation). Alternatively, if apparent
WPV1 elimination occurs before the world meets the
prerequisites for OPV2 cessation, then cessation of all 3
serotypes of OPV (i.e., OPV123 cessation) may offer a
means to combine the substantial logistics of phased
OPV cessation (i.e., OPV2 followed by OPV13 cessa-
tion) into a single event (i.e., OPV123 cessation), which
would also potentially simplify vaccine choices up until
OPV123 cessation. Despite the importance of the
choices, no prior studies have characterized the health
or economic impacts of different OPV cessation timing
options. This study uses modeling to explore the health
and economic implications of different OPV cessation
timing options and the associated numbers of different
formulations of poliovirus vaccines needed for each
option.
Methods
We use an integrated global model of long-term polio-
virus risk management options (i.e., the global model)
described in detail elsewhere [34]. Briefly, the model re-
lies on a deterministic, dynamic poliovirus transmission
and OPV evolution model [35, 36] to track immunity,
poliovirus incidence, and any cVDPV emergences in
populations. We determined model input values based
on an extensive expert review and model calibration
process [22, 26, 35–37]. The expert review process elic-
ited ranges of numerical values for generic (i.e., not
setting-specific) model inputs to characterize immunity
states, waning, and OPV evolution based on the expert
interpretation of the evidence [8, 22, 37]. The model
calibration process ensured internal consistency and
found model inputs within the elicited ranges that pro-
duced behavior consistent with the evidence of numer-
ous aspects of poliovirus transmission (i.e., paralytic
incidence during endemic transmission and outbreaks,
WPV elimination, recipient and contact VAPP incidence,
secondary OPV spread and evolution, cVDPV emergence
in some settings but not in others, age distributions of
cases, serology, and serotype differences) across 10 dif-
ferent situations (i.e., countries or parts of countries)
[26, 35, 36]. To estimate recipient VAPP cases, the polio-
virus transmission and OPV evolution model tracks
OPV infections (i.e., OPV vaccinations that take) in sus-
ceptible people (i.e., fully susceptible individuals and a
fraction of infants born with maternal immunity) and
multiplies these with serotype-specific paralysis-to-
infection ratios for OPV [35]. The model assumes that
the paralysis-to-infection ratios depend on the serotype
but not the OPV formulation, such that differences in
VAPP incidence for tOPV, bOPV, and mOPV depend on
vaccine used, the difference in serotype-specific take
rates, and the resulting probability of acquiring immun-
ity from OPV receipt versus infection from exposure to
an LPV [35]. To estimate contact VAPP cases, the
model tracks all infections in fully susceptible people
with OPV-related viruses that did not yet evolve to
fully-reverted VDPVs, and assumes that the serotype-
specific VAPP rates increase logarithmically with each
of 19 stages of reversion toward the serotype-specific
paralysis-to-infection rates for VDPV (assumed to be
equivalent to homotypic WPV) [35]. Thus, contact
VAPP cases include all paralytic infections from OPV
and OPV-related viruses, but not from fully-reverted
VDPV, which the model classifies as cVDPV or iVDPV
outbreak cases, depending on the source of the virus.
The global model [34] estimates the number of polio
cases that occur and the costs of different long-term
poliovirus risk management options compared with the
continued status quo of OPV use in most countries to
characterize incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs)
and incremental net benefits (INBs) using 2013 United
States dollars ($). The global model estimates financial
costs associated with RI and SIAs, including any outbreak
response SIAs (oSIAs) before and after OPV cessation
[34]. The global model assumes that surveillance, treat-
ment, and other programmatic activities remain the same
for the main policy options [34] and the alternative OPV
cessation timing options considered in this analysis. We
adopt all of the economic inputs from the global model
[34], including a 3 % discount rate, treatment and societal
economic costs per paralytic case, disability-adjusted life-
years (DALYs) averted per prevented paralytic case, and
vaccination cost inputs. We model the costs for different
OPV vaccine formulations as equivalent [34] and
emphasize that IPV costs significantly more than OPV,
with some differences by income level. We report ICERS
and INBs from a societal perspective in 2015 for each al-
ternative OPV cessation timing option compared to the
current timing plan of OPV2 cessation in April 2016
followed by OPV13 cessation in April 2019, based on ex-
pected costs and cases during 2015–2019.
To model the global population and poliovirus trans-
mission, the global model [34] assumes 710 subpopula-
tions of approximately 10 million people (in 2013) that
mix homogenously in space and heterogeneously by age.
The global model further groups these 710 subpopula-
tions into 71 blocks consisting of 10 subpopulations and
randomly generates exportations of poliovirus from sub-
populations, assuming the majority remain within the
block. We base the epidemiological, demographic, and
transmission assumptions for the blocks and subpopula-
tions on the conditions that exist in the world in 2013
[34]. The global model further generates randomly
occurring poliovirus reintroduction events from different
sources after OPV cessation [7], including iVDPVs [13] and
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releases of seed strains from IPV production sites. However,
given our focus for this analysis on the more predictable
short-term outcomes (i.e., VAPP cases and cVDPV emer-
gences), we ignore these stochastic risks here.
Table 1 lists the different OPV cessation timing op-
tions modeled. We assume that all OPV cessation timing
options involve a global minimum recommendation of
at least 1 added IPV RI dose for at least 5 years after ces-
sation of the last OPV serotype in all blocks that used
only OPV for RI in 2013 (i.e., 52 of 71 blocks). Unless
otherwise noted, the model assumes that blocks that use
only OPV in 2013 add 1 IPV RI dose co-administered
with OPV at the scheduled age of the third non-birth
OPV RI dose (low- or lower middle-income blocks) or
switch to a sequential IPV/OPV schedule (upper middle-
income blocks) on January 1, 2015. At the time of cessa-
tion of the last OPV serotype, all blocks that already
switched to a sequential IPV/OPV schedule move to an
IPV-only RI schedule, while blocks that only include a
single IPV dose added to a primary OPV RI schedule con-
tinue with a single IPV RI dose [34]. The global model
adopts previously developed methods to characterize the
different RI schedules [35, 38]. Specifically, in the context
of uncertainty about the age at which partially covered
children (i.e., those that do not receive the full non-birth
RI schedule, but receive at least one non-birth dose) re-
ceive their polio dose(s), the schedule of 1 added IPV RI
dose co-administered with OPV assumes that all children
who receive at least one non-birth OPV RI dose also re-
ceive the IPV dose [38].
All options assume tOPV intensification from January 1,
2015 characterized by an increased proportion of planned,
preventive SIAs (pSIAs, which excludes all oSIAs) using
tOPV instead of bOPV [34, 39]. The current timing plan
(i.e., status quo) option assumes OPV2 cessation on April
1, 2016, consistent with the current target date [33], and
OPV13 cessation on April 1, 2019, consistent with the an-
ticipated window [17]. For the current timing plan option,
we assume that RI and all tOPV pSIAs switch to bOPV
after OPV2 cessation until OPV13 cessation. We also con-
sider the option of combining OPV2 and OPV3 cessation,
which continues the use of all OPV serotypes (i.e., tOPV)
until April 1, 2017, and then switches all RI and pSIA vac-
cine to mOPV1 on April 1, 2017 (OPV23 cessation in
2017). For simultaneous cessation of all three OPV sero-
types, we consider options stopping on April 1, 2018 (i.e.,
OPV123 cessation in 2018) or 2019 (i.e., OPV123 cessation
in 2019), for which we assume continued tOPV use for RI
and continuation of the pSIA vaccine mix of tOPV and
bOPV associated with tOPV intensification [34, 39] until
OPV123 cessation. We explore a variation that starts the
same way but assumes tOPV use exclusively from April 1,
2017 until April 1, 2019 (i.e., OPV123 cessation in 2019
with tOPV-only from 2017). The deterministic run-up of
the global model leads to global eradication of all WPVs in
early 2016, and thus the latter scenario assumes that
Table 1 OPV cessation timing options considered










RI vaccineb SIA vaccine(s)c
Current timing plan April 1, 2019 April 1, 2016 April 1, 2019 January 1, 2015 tOPV before OPV2 cessation,
then bOPV until OPV13 cessation
tOPV and bOPV before OPV2




April 1, 2019 April 1, 2017 April 1, 2017 January 1, 2015 tOPV before OPV23 cessation,
then mOPV1 until OPV1 cessation
tOPV and bOPV before OPV23













April 1, 2019 April 1, 2019 April 1, 2019 January 1, 2015 tOPV until all-OPV cessation tOPV and bOPV until April 1,
2017, then only tOPV until
OPV123 cessation
OPV123 cessation
in 2019 with IPV
added from 2018
April 1, 2019 April 1, 2019 April 1, 2019 January 1, 2018 tOPV until all-OPV cessation tOPV and bOPV until OPV123
cessation
Abbreviations: bOPV, bivalent OPV (serotypes 1 and 3); IPV, inactivated poliovirus vaccine; mOPV1, serotype 1 monovalent OPV; OPV, oral poliovirus vaccine;
OPV(##) cessation, globally-coordinated cessation of OPV containing the serotype(s) indicated by ##; RI, routine immunization; SIA, supplemental immunization
activity; tOPV, trivalent OPV
aAssumes IPV co-administered with third non-birth OPV RI dose from time of addition of IPV dose until cessation of the last OPV serotype, followed by
a single-IPV-dose schedule for low- and lower middle-income blocks; assumes a sequential IPV/IPV/OPV/OPV schedule from time of addition of IPV doses
until cessation of the last OPV serotypes followed by IPV/IPV/IPV schedule in upper middle-income blocks that use OPV-only in 2013; assumes a sequential IPV/IPV/OPV/
OPV schedule from the beginning of the analytical time horizon until cessation of the last OPV serotypes followed by an IPV/IPV/IPV schedule in upper middle- and
high-income blocks that already use IPV/OPV in 2013; assumes an IPV/IPV/IPV schedule for all years in high-income countries that already use IPV-only in 2013 [34]
bIn blocks that use OPV or IPV/OPV for RI in 2013
cIn blocks that use OPV or IPV/OPV in 2013 and require SIAs, not including any mOPV used for outbreak response SIAs that override any planned, preventive SIAs [34]
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approximately 1 year after global WPV interruption the
focus would shift equally to all 3 serotypes by using only
tOPV. Finally, we consider a variation of OPV123 cessation
in 2019 with delayed global IPV introduction on January 1,
2018 (i.e., OPV123 cessation in 2019 with IPV added from
2018) instead of the current timing plan assumption of glo-
bal IPV introduction on January 1, 2015, although countries
increasingly continue to include IPV in their RI schedules.
To estimate numbers of doses of vaccine used, we adopt
effective wastage estimates from the global model [34, 39],
which for SIAs include both actual wastage and a demo-
graphic uncertainty factor of 1.5 to account for differences
in the United Nations World Population Prospects estimates
[40] and the estimates used by the GPEI in SIA planning.
Results
Due to the assumed sufficiently high frequency of SIAs
leading up to OPV cessation of any serotype for all OPV
cessation options, none of the options lead to any subse-
quent cVDPV cases. With only a small number of para-
lytic cases from WPV1 remaining in the model during
the first year of the time horizon (i.e., 4 in 2015), VAPP
cases represent the main source of paralytic poliomyel-
itis in the model for 2015–2019. Table 2 lists the ex-
pected total number of VAPP cases for each of the OPV
cessation timing options, along with the number of
tOPV, bOPV, mOPV1, and IPV vaccine doses used dur-
ing this time period. With respect to the VAPP cases,
the duration of OPV use of each serotype and IPV use
represent the main drivers. For example, the current
timing plan results in the fewest serotype 2 VAPP
cases because it stops all serotype 2-containing vac-
cine use one year earlier than the other options con-
sidered. OPV23 cessation in 2017 yields the fewest
VAPP cases overall, because in 2017 it removes the
two serotypes most frequently associated with VAPP
[35]. While co-administration of IPV with OPV in low
and lower middle-income blocks results in a negligible
impact on VAPP, switching to a sequential IPV/OPV
schedule in the 19 upper middle-income blocks that used
OPV-only in 2013 results in a large reduction, notable in
the difference in global VAPP totals between OPV123 ces-
sation in 2019 with IPV added in 2018 and OPV123 cessa-
tion in 2019 (i.e., with IPV added in 2015 as planned).
With respect to vaccine dose estimates, our results in-
clude the entire world (i.e., not just countries supported
by the GPEI), assume relatively high effective wastage,
and assume sustained high SIA frequency up until cessa-
tion of the last OPV serotype [39]. Most scenarios result
in the same number of 12.8 billion total polio vaccine
doses over the 5-year time period, including 11.4 billion
OPV doses (89 %) and approximately 1.3 billion IPV
doses (11 %). However, OPV123 cessation in 2018 im-
plies one fewer year of OPV use than the other options,
which saves 2.5 billion OPV doses. OPV123 cessation in
2019 with IPV added from 2018 involves three years of
global IPV use less than the other options, which saves
0.6 billion IPV doses. OPV123 cessation in 2018 involves
slightly more IPV doses than all other options with non-
delayed global IPV introduction, because earlier OPV
cessation of the last serotype implies that blocks with a
sequential IPV/OPV schedule move to IPV-only one year
earlier than all other options.
Table 3 provides estimates of the ICERs and INBs for
the alternative OPV cessation timing options compared
to the current timing plan. These estimates include the
vaccination costs only, and do not include any program-
matic costs for surveillance, laboratories, stockpile, or
coordination of OPV cessation, which we assume would
generally cancel out in the context of the incremental
analyses. All but one of the ICERs involve either costs
savings (i.e., negative numerators) or additional incurred
paralytic cases (i.e., negative denominators), or both,
making the ICER numerically ill-defined [41, 42]. For
OPV123 cessation in 2018, in high-income blocks, the
incremental costs remain marginally positive due to the
Table 2 Estimated (undiscounted) VAPP cases and OPV vaccine use by serotype for the different OPV cessation timing options that
all lead to no expected cVDPV cases
Name of OPV cessation timing option Number of VAPP cases 2015-2019 Polio vaccine use 2015–2019 (billions of doses)a
PV1 PV2 PV3 Total tOPV bOPV mOPV1 IPV All polio vaccine
Current timing plan 41 75 404 520 3.3 8.2 0 1.3 12.8
OPV23 cessation in 2017 42 122 219 383 5.2 1.3 4.9 1.3 12.8
OPV123 cessation in 2018 34 168 302 504 7.1 1.9 0 1.4 10.4
OPV123 cessation in 2019 43 214 383 634 9.0 2.5 0 1.3 12.8
OPV123 cessation in 2019 with tOPV-only from 2017 44 210 382 635 10.1 1.3 0 1.3 12.8
OPV123 cessation in 2019 with IPV added from 2018 58 252 499 810 9.2 2.5 0 0.8 12.4
Abbreviations: bOPV, bivalent OPV (serotypes 1 and 3); cVPDV, circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus; IPV, inactivated poliovirus vaccine; mOPV1, serotype 1
monovalent OPV; OPV, oral poliovirus vaccine; OPV(##) cessation, globally-coordinated cessation of OPV containing the serotype(s) indicated by ##; PV(1,2,3),
poliovirus (serotype 1, 2, or 3, respectively); RI, routine immunization; SIA, supplemental immunization activity; tOPV, trivalent OPV; VAPP, vaccine-associated
paralytic poliomyelitis
aIncludes RI and planned, preventive SIAs, with no outbreak response SIAs triggered for any of the options
Thompson and Duintjer Tebbens BMC Infectious Diseases  (2015) 15:374 Page 5 of 9
earlier move to an all-IPV schedule while preventing less
than one VAPP case, leading to a very high ICER of 1.9
million $ per DALY averted due to the very small (i.e.,
almost 0) denominator.
The INBs represent a more informative metric for this
analysis. OPV23 cessation in 2017, OPV123 cessation in
2019, and OPV123 cessation in 2019 with tOPV-only
from 2017 all result in the same expected financial costs
for vaccination as the current timing plan because they
involve different OPV formulations without affecting the
overall duration of OPV or IPV use in any of the income
levels. Thus, for these alternative OPV cessation timing
options the incremental costs reflect only treatment
costs (or savings) associated with additional incurred (or
prevented) paralytic cases. Given the relatively small
number of paralytic cases involved in any of these op-
tions, their INBs remain close to 0. The INB estimate of
approximately -$4.5 million for OPV123 cessation in
2019 (with or without tOPV-only from 2017) suggests
that if the excluded logistical costs of coordinating OPV
cessation once instead of twice amount to more than $4
million (and OPV123 cessation in 2018 remains logistic-
ally impossible), then some economic justification exists
for this original path of coordinated OPV cessation of all
three OPV serotypes. OPV123 cessation in 2019 with
tOPV-only from 2017 yields almost the same INBs as
OPV123 cessation in 2019, which involves some contin-
ued bOPV SIAs (Table 2). However, OPV123 cessation
with tOPV-only from 2017 results in higher population
immunity to transmission for serotype 2 while not sig-
nificantly reducing population immunity to transmission
for serotypes 1 and 3 [43]. Thus, OPV123 cessation with
tOPV-only from 2017 offers the potential to further re-
duce cVDPV2 risks and/or reduce the frequency of SIAs
needed to avoid cVDPVs of any serotype after OPV123
cessation [39, 43].
Two OPV cessation timing options result in substan-
tial expected INBs. If logistically possible, OPV123 cessa-
tion in 2018 results in INBs of $1.2 billion, because
stopping all OPV use one year earlier significantly re-
duces the total number of vaccinations while also pre-
venting some VAPP cases. However, this option only
becomes feasible with very rapid achievement and confi-
dence of interruption of WPV1 transmission. OPV123
cessation in 2019 with IPV added from 2018 results in
INBs of approximately $0.9 billion associated with sav-
ings from later global IPV introduction. While this option
results in the most VAPP cases among the considered op-
tions, later global IPV introduction yields cost savings des-
pite the relative low fraction of IPV doses in the total
polio vaccine doses used, which occurs due to the com-
paratively high IPV cost per dose.
Discussion
Our analysis demonstrates the large number of viable
OPV cessation options that avoid cVDPVs after OPV ces-
sation of each serotype, as long as SIA intensity remains
high enough. In this context, the overall economic impli-
cations of different OPV cessation timing options remain
relatively small, unless the options involve a shorter dur-
ation of OPV or IPV use globally. Prior experience with
polio shows a societal willingness to accept large financial
costs to prevent or reduce a relatively small burden of
vaccine-associated disease [44], which may favor options
that avoid more VAPP cases regardless of small differences
in incremental net benefits. The large benefits of poten-
tially stopping all OPV use earlier reinforce the point that
earlier global eradication is better, even if it may require
more resources in the short term [45]. However, optimally
balancing the risk of undetected WPV circulation against
the potential benefits of stopping the last OPV serotype
earlier remains complex [31]. If delays in cessation of the
first OPV serotype (i.e., OPV2) appear likely, then post-
poning OPV2 cessation until the earliest possible time of
OPV13 cessation may offer the advantage of saving the
costs associated with coordinating global OPV cessation
of at least one serotype twice. However, given that OPV2
viruses evolve more rapidly to become cVDPVs than the
Table 3 Incremental economic outcomes for different OPV cessation timing options compared to the current timing plan based on
vaccination costs and expected paralytic polio cases between 2015 and 2019
Alternative Incremental cost-effectiveness ratioa Incremental net benefits ($)
LOW LMI UMI HIGH LOW LMI UMI HIGH All
OPV23 cessation in 2017 CLS CLS CLS CLS 0.3 3.0 2.7 1.3 7.3
OPV123 cessation in 2018 CLS CLS CLS 1.9 300 660 190 −8.6 1,100
OPV123 cessation in 2019 Dominated Dominated Dominated Dominated −0.3 −2.6 −1.6 0 −4.6
OPV123 cessation in 2019 with tOPV-only from 2017 Dominated Dominated Dominated Dominated −0.3 −2.5 −1.6 0 −4.5
OPV123 cessation in 2019 with IPV added from 2018 CSLC CSLC CSLC Dominated 110 370 380 0 860
Abbreviations: HIGH, high-income; IPV, inactivated poliovirus vaccine; LMI, lower middle-income; LOW, low-income; OPV, oral poliovirus vaccine; OPV(##) cessation,
globally-coordinated cessation of OPV containing the serotype(s) indicated by ##; UMI, upper middle-income; $, 2013 United States dollar
aNumbers represent millions of $ per disability-adjusted life-year averted; Letters are: CLS, cost and life-saving (i.e., negative incremental costs and positive cases
prevented); CSLC cost-saving but life-costing (i.e., positive incremental costs and negative cases prevented); Dominated, positive incremental costs and negative
cases prevented
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other two serotypes [8, 35], longer continuation of OPV2
use may imply a higher frequency of SIAs needed for a
longer period of time to avoid cVDPV2 emergence [39].
Thus, the current path of OPV2 cessation before OPV13
cessation may offer some potential to save on SIA costs
after OPV2 cessation, although this remains a topic of fur-
ther research.
Our results related to saving financial costs in the short-
term by slightly delaying global introduction of IPV artifi-
cially assume perfect coordination of implementation. The
significant expected benefits of global IPV introduction
for the long-term management of poliovirus risks, includ-
ing individual protection from potential reintroduction of
live polioviruses, support a global commitment to IPV
introduction [34]. Nevertheless, the logistics of introdu-
cing a new vaccine into the complex array of RI schedules
[16] for over 120 countries using OPV-only for RI be-
tween 2013 and the date by which all countries introduce
IPV remain a challenge. Our analysis of delayed IPV intro-
duction provides a lower bound on cost reduction since
many countries already introduced IPV as part of the run
up to OPV2 cessation and we do not expect that countries
would stop using IPV in the context of a global delay.
Aggressive efforts to introduce IPV continue to reveal
many issues, and IPV introduction will involve some
phase-in due to the logistics of RI system planning and
long lead times associated with scale-up of IPV produc-
tion capacity. Current timing plans that include the intro-
duction of IPV with the third dose of OPV in RI do not
promise to provide much protection from cVDPVs or
VAPP [30]. In contrast, IPV use prevents VAPP cases if
used in a sequential schedule [25, 46], and consequently
we suggest that all countries may benefit from considering
IPV introduction as an opportunity to change to a sequen-
tial IPV/OPV schedule, even if including only a single dose
of IPV, to obtain the benefits of VAPP reduction as soon
as possible. Further analyses should consider the costs,
benefits, and other implications of pursuing this strategy
instead of the current strategy of introducing IPV with the
third OPV dose.
While our model provides the first estimates of the
economic implications of different OPV cessation tim-
ing options, several limitations may impact our results.
First, we assume continued high SIA frequency up until
cessation of the last OPV serotype, which includes as-
sumptions that may prove optimistic for the timing of
global WPV eradication and number of WPV cases. More
WPV cases in reality than currently modeled would not
necessarily affect incremental economic metrics (i.e.,
ICERs and INBs), because the cases would occur for all
OPV cessation timing options. However, longer trans-
mission of WPV1 and/or cVDPV2 will affect the feasibility
of some of the options and expected SIA frequency and
costs. Some reduction in SIA frequency may remain
sufficient to keep population immunity high enough to
avoid cVDPVs after OPV cessation, although too much re-
duction or inconsistency in SIA quality would result in
cVDPVs [39], and insufficient immunization in Pakistan,
particularly in the under-vaccinated (and inaccessible)
subpopulation, will lead to a delay in WPV1 eradication
and/or meeting the current pre-requisites for OPV2 cessa-
tion. Second, significant uncertainty about effective vac-
cine wastage led us to include a demographic uncertainty
factor of 1.5, which significantly increases dose estimates
and costs [39]. Better estimates of demographics and vac-
cine tracking would lead to improved estimates. Third, we
did not explicitly account for programmatic costs not re-
lated to vaccination, including the costs to coordinate
OPV cessation, which represents a large logistical chal-
lenge. However, we assumed that these costs would apply
to all of the options we modeled and thus cancel out in
the incremental economic metrics. The small difference in
INBs between options with one or two OPV cessation
events suggests that combining cessation of all OPV sero-
types may offer some cost savings that this analysis does
not capture. Fourth, the global situation continues to
evolve, and this leads to some discrepancies between the
model and the most up-to-date expected current path.
For example, China, which represents half of the popula-
tion in all upper middle-income countries, will likely not
adopt an IPV/IPV/OPV/OPV sequential schedule in 2015
but transition to this schedule by first adopting an IPV/
OPV/OPV/OPV schedule, which results in lower costs.
Similarly, many countries may not introduce IPV by the
end of 2015 due to the logistical challenges and time de-
lays associated with global IPV supply phase-in and pro-
duction. Fifth, the global model assumes that all children
in low and lower middle-income blocks who receive at
least one non-birth OPV RI dose do so at the age of the
third non-birth RI OPV dose so that they also receive a
co-administered IPV dose [34, 38]. This assumption may
somewhat overestimate IPV-induced immunity and IPV
costs if in reality only children who receive 3 or more
OPV doses receive IPV. Sixth, we did not include the
long-term poliovirus risk implications of different OPV
cessation timing options. While the impact of different
OPV cessation timing options on probabilities of long-
term outbreaks likely remains small, even small changes
in probabilities can result in large consequences in a frac-
tion of stochastic model realizations [34]. Seventh, we did
not address how tightly cessation needs to be coordinated,
and further research should address this issue. Finally, all
limitations and uncertainties from the global model [34]
and the dynamic poliovirus transmission and OPV evolu-
tion model [35] also apply to this analysis.
Our analysis leads to the realization that flexibility in
national vaccine licensing for the transition period may
prove helpful. While under the current plan the GPEI
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continues to encourage countries to pursue licenses of
bOPV for RI use after OPV2 cessation, our analysis sug-
gests potential value in simultaneously pursuing national
licenses for RI use of bOPV or mOPV1, and potentially
also securing licenses now to use any mOPV serotype
for outbreak response if ever needed. In addition, given
uncertainty about the status of population immunity for
serotype 2, our results underscore the importance of de-
veloping contingencies with manufacturers to continue
tOPV production past the current planned OPV2 cessa-
tion target of April 2016.
Conclusions
All countries should maintain the highest possible levels
of population immunity to transmission for each polio-
virus serotype prior to the coordinated cessation of the
OPV serotype. If OPV2 cessation gets delayed, then global
health leaders should consider other OPV cessation timing
options.
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